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Windle: Copyright Law

COPYRIGHT LAW

COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE
NON- VIOLENCE
v. JAMES EARL REID: A

CLEARER PICTURE FOR ARTISTS
Christopher M. Windle*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Community for Creative Non- Violence v. James Earl
Reid l the United States Supreme Court addressed copyright
ownership of artwork made for hire by independent contractors.
Prior to this decision, courts held four differing views 2 on vesting
of copyright for free-lance artists including writers, photographers, designers, composers, illustrators, painters and filmmakers.s The Ninth Circuit view of work for hire closely parallels the Supreme Court view. Community for Creative NonViolence affects not only the initial vesting of copyright ownership but also copyright duration,' owner's renewal rights,!! termi• Christopher M. Windle is an associate with the law firm, Cartwright, Slobodin,
Bokelman, Borowsky, Wartnick, Moore & Harris, Inc. Prior to graduating from Golden
Gate University School of Law in 1988, he owned his own graphic design business in San
Francisco.
1. 109 S.Ct. 2166 (1989).
2. See infra n. 23-26 and accompanying text.
3. 17 U.S.C. §102 (1976) provides a partiailisting of the subject matter of copyright.
4. 17 U.S.C. §302(c)(1976) provides in part:
In the case of. . . work made for hire, the copyright endures
for a term of seventy-five years from the year of its first publication, or a term of one hundred years from the year of its
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nation rights 6 and the right to import certain goods bearing the
copyright. 7
Copyright initially vests in the author of the work. 8 However, a distinction is made for "work made for hire" under the
1976 Copyright Act. 9
In the case of work made for hire, the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author ... and ... owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright. 10

Artists who provide work for hire are denied copyright
ownership.
Prior to Community for Creative Non- Violence, the contours of the work for hire doctrine were ill defined since courts
acted without benefit of legislative guidelines. The holding of
Community for Creative Non- Violence resolves the ambiguities
surrounding work for hire. l l This comment will briefly review
the history of work for hire; analyze the Supreme Court Decision; compare the Supreme Court decision and the view of the
Ninth Circuit; and comment on the impact of Community for
Creative Non- Violence on free-Iance 12 artists.
II. FACTS
The Washington, D.C., based Community for Creative NonViolence (hereinafter "CCNV") commissioned a Baltimore artist
creation, whichever expires first.
5. 17 U.S.C. §304(a) (1976). This section provides that:
In the case of work made for hire, "the proprietor of such
copyright shall be entitle to a renewal and extension of the
copyright in such work for the furthest term of forty-seven
years ....
6. See 17 U.S.C. §203(a) (1976). Provisions of this section regarding termination of
transfers and licenses granted by the author do not apply to cases involving work for
hire.
7. 17 U.S.C. §601(b)(l) (1976). See Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart
Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985).
8. See 17 U.S.C. §201(a) (1976) which reads in part:
Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in
the author or authors of the work.
9. 17 U.S.C. §201(b) (1976).
10. [d.

11. The phrase "work for hire" refers to the statutory phrase "works made for hire."
12. Free lance[rJ is used interchangeably with independent contractor.
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to create a sculpture depicting a homeless family which was displayed at a political event. IS CCNY conceived the idea for the
project and chose the title. The work was done by the artist in
his Baltimore studio where he used his own tools. CCNY participated in the design of the project and independently produced
the base for the figures. The statue was displayed for a month
and returned to the artist for repairs. The artist subsequently
filed a certificate of copyright for the work in his name. CCNY
filed a competing certificate of copyright and sued for a determination of copyright ownership. 14
The trial court ruled the statue was a work for hire under
§101 of the Copyright Act and that CCNY owned the copyright. HI The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that the sculpture was not a work for hire and
the artist owned the copyright because he was an independent
contractor.16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
III.

WORK FOR HIRE

Work for hire is typically provided by commercial artists
working as independent contractors who bid on projects and are
responsible for benefits and taxes. 17 The client l8 may use freelancers because it does not have the volume of work necessary to
support staff artists or finds it cheaper than maintaining an inhouse staff. The client realizes a savings by avoiding the added
expense of benefits.
Often, the issue of copyright ownership is not addressed and
the client assumes copyright ownership since it paid for the
work. A dispute may arise when the artwork is used outside the
scope of the original project.
13.
(D.D.C.
14.
15.

Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 Fed.Supp. 1453, 1454
1987).
Neither party discussed copyright during negotiations. [d.
Community for Creative Non- Violence, 652 F.Supp. at 1457.
16. Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 846 Fed.2d 1485, 1499 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
17. For a discussion of artists' business arrangements, see L. DUBOFF, ART LAW 773792 (1977).
18. "Client" refers to commissioning party and purchaser.
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COPYRIGHT AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

Traditionally, copyright vests in the author of the work. 19
The 1909 Copyright Act20 provided that the term author included an employer in the case of works made for hire. 21 The
Act did not define the terms employer, employee or works made
for hire. The courts were responsible for defining these terms
and a majority ruled that an independent contractor is an employee for copyright purposes. 22 It was presumed that the artist
had impliedly agreed to convey the copyright to the hiring
party.2S
1976

COPYRIGHT ACTu

In 1955, the Congress initiated revision of the Copyright Act
and after debating the work for hire doctrine reached a compromise. Section 101 of the 1976 Act created two categories of work
for hire.
(1) A work prepared by an employee within the scope of his
or her employment; or
(2) A work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or
other audio-visual work, as a translation, as a supplementary
work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall
be considered a work made for hire. 211
The 1976 Act, like its predecessor, did not define key terms
and courts assumed the task of interpreting this statute. Four
views on work for hire evolved. 28
19.
cl. 8.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
Society

This right was acknowledged by the United States Constitution in Article I, §8
17 U.S.C. §26 (1976 ed.) (1909 Act).
[d.
See Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin, Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939).
[d.
17 U.S.C. §101 et. seq.
17 U.S.C. §101 (1976).
A discussion of the ambiguity of the Copyright Act is provided in Easter Seal
for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprise, 815
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The first vested copyright ownership with the client who retained control over production. In Peregrine v. Lauren Corp.27
the court focused on the client's right to supervise a photographer even though he was an independent contractor for tax and
benefit purposes. Peregrine held determinative the fact that the
client could change or reject the photographer's ideas. A second
view was expressed by the Second Circuit in Aldon Accessories,
Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc. 28 where the court closely examined the creative process. Aldon held that copyright vests with the client who
actively supervises and directs the artist during production of
the artwork.
The third view was endorsed by the 5th Circuit in Easter
Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana,
Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises. 29 Easter Seal relied on agency law
to define the term employee and limited the client's right to
copyright ownership to the nine categories listed in section
101(2) of the Copyright Act.
The final view, expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Dumas v.
Gommerman so held that only the works of salaried employees
are covered by §101(1). Section 101(2) limits client ownership to
the nine categories of commissioned works.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court resolved the copyright issue by relying
on agency principles 31 and held that Section 101 of the Copyright Act created two categories of client ownership: 1) works
prepared by employees and 2) the nine categories of commissioned works.s2
The Court noted that a determination of copyright ownership begins with ascertaining whether the work was performed
f.2d 323, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1987).
27. 601 F.Supp. 828 (Colo. 1985).
28. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984).
29. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
30. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
31. The court relied on the Restatement of Agency for guidance. Community for
Creative Non- Violence at 2171, n. 31.
32. Community for Creative Non- Violence, 846 F.2d at 2170.
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by an employee or an independent contractor. 33 If the work was
performed by an employee, Section 101(1) applies and the employer owns the copyright. 34 Otherwise, copyright vests with the
independent contractor except for the nine categories of work
listed in Section 101(2).311
The following agency principles were applied by the Court
to determine if the artist was an employee: whether the client
controlled the manner and means by which the project was accomplished;3s the skill required;37 the source of the instrumentalities and tools;38 location of the work;39 duration of the relationship between the parties;40 whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired party;U extent of
the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;42
method of payment;43 the artist's role in hiring and paying assistants;" whether the work is part of the regular business of the
client; 41! whether the client is in business;4s provision of employment benefit;47 and the tax treatment of the hired party.48
In Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Supreme
Court rejected the Peregrine and Aldon view that a client's right
to exercise control over the project is dispositive.'9 The Court
stressed that no single factor was determinative. llo The client in
Community for Creative Non- Violence conceived the idea for
the sculpture; provided design input; directed the production to
33. [d. at 2171.
34. [d. at 2169.
35. [d.
36. See Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1982).
37. See Bartels v. Burmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947).
38. See NLRB v. United States Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §220(2)(e).
39. See Darden v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1986).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §220(2)(f).
41. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105.
42. See Short v. Central States Southeast & Southeast Areas Pension Fund, 729
F.2d 567, 574 (8th Cir. 1984).
43. See Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
44. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 719 (1947).
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §220(2)(h).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §220(2)(j).
47. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105.
48. [d.
49. Community for Creative Non- Violence, 109 S.Ct. at 2170.
50. [d.
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ensure the finished sculpture met their specifications; and chose
the title. lIl Nevertheless, the court ruled that on balance, the artist was an independent contractor .112 The court was persuaded by
the facts that the artist was a sculptor, a skilled occupation; he
worked in his own studio with his own tools; the artist was given
only this one commission; he worked at his own pace; and the
client did not provide any benefits or pay any payroll or social
security taxes. 1I3
After weighing all the factors, the Court determined the artist was an independent contractor and the client could not claim
copyright ownership under §101(1).1I4 Furthermore, the client
was denied copyright under §101(2) because the project was not
one of the nine listed categories. 1I1I The Court concluded that the
client was not the author of the work by application of the work
for hire provision. 1I8
V. COMPARISON OF COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE
NON- VIOLENCE AND DUMAS
Dumas v. Gommerman ll7 was a case of first impression for
the Ninth Circuit on the issue of whether the District Court applied the correct legal standard in determining if an artist is an
employee producing work for hire under 17 U.S.C. §101. 118 In
Dumas ll9 the artist was hired by ITT to create four lithographs.
ITT later sold the copyright to Stefan Gommerman. Jennifer
Dumas, widow of the artist, sued for copyright as successor in
interest. 8o Gommerman did not contend that the artist had been
an employee of ITT but argued that the appropriate test for determining if an artist is an employee is whether there was any
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Community for Creative Non- Violence, 652 F.Supp. 1453, 1454 (D.D.C. 1987).
[d. at Community for Creative Non- Violence, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 2171.
[d.
[d.
[d.
56. [d. (The Court acknowledged that CCNV could be a joint author. See, 17 U.S.C.
§§101 and 201(a) (1976».
57. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
58. Prior to Dumas, the Ninth Circuit had reviewed work for hire under the 1909
Act in, May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Associate, 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.1980).
59. In 1979 Patrick Nagel was commissioned to create four works of art that lIT
Cannon gave as sets of lithographs to its distributors as part of a promotional campaign.
60. The original paintings were lost. Gommerman purchased the remaining sets of
lithographs from ITT Cannon.
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identifiable direction and control. S1 The Ninth Circuit rejected
this argument and foreshadowed the Supreme Court decision
with its view that the 1976 Act creates only two instances where
the artist loses the copyright. They are: (1) if the artist is an
employee of the purchaser or (2) if the work falls under any of
the enumerated catagories in §101(2) and the parties have a
written agreement. S2
The Ninth Circuit deviates from the Supreme Court view
which permits the courts to look at the employers right to control the manner and means by which the art work is produced in
determining if the artist is an employee. ss The Ninth Circuit rejects the supervision and control test because it could result in
employers changing the employment status of an artist as was
done in Peregrine. 64 In the Ninth Circuit's view, the 1976 Copyright Act created a bright line between employee and independent contractor for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of artists working as independent contractors. The Ninth Circuit
feared that "some independent Contractors could be deemed
'employees' where the purchaser includes provisions in the contract granting it substantial rights of control."SIi
The Ninth Circuit alone addresses the issue of copyright inception. Under the 1909 Act, Federal copyright was secured by
publication with notice. ss The 1976 act changed the law and provided that copyright subsists from the moment of fixation in any
tangible medium. Publication is not a factor.67 Furthermore,
61. Gommerman contended that the artist was an employee if ITf had exercised
control over the creative process in any amount and pointed to the fact that ITf,
through its agent, D'Arcy, MacManus & Masius, Inc., had directed some of the design
aspects of the paintings. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1094.
62. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1102.
63. In Community for Creative Non- Violence, the Supreme Court utilized several
common law agency factors to determine if the artist was an employee. They included,
"the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished." Community for Creative Non- Violence, 109 S.Ct.at 2178.
64. In Peregrine, the photographer was an independent contractor based on the
method of payment. However, the trial court found the artist was an employee because
"it was clear that at any point the employer could have vetoed any of Mr. Peregrine's
ideas .... " Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F.Supp. 828, 829 (D.C.Colo.1985).
65. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1104. The Ninth Circuit intends to prevent the possibility
that the purchaser can unilaterally change the artist's employment status without the
artist's knowledge. [d.
66. 17 U.S.C. §10 (repealed 1976).
67. See 17 U.S.C. section 101, definition of "created" and "fixed" which provides:
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copyright under the 1976 act exists even in work in progress. 68
The Ninth Circuit also makes clear that a transfer of copyright ownership requires a written instrument.6s Therefore, the
sale alone of a material object in which a work is fixed does not
transfer the copyright in the work. 70 Since §201(a) establishes
the author as initial owner of the copyright in works other than
works for hire and copyright vests in the independent contractor
at the moment of fixation, a written instrument is required to
transfer copyright ownership to the purchaser. 71
The Ninth Circuit sheds light on another aspect of the independent contractors' rights under the 1976 Copyright Act. As
the original owner of the copyright, the independent contractor
retains termination rights even if copyright is transferred. 72 17
A work is "created" when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord
for the first time; where work is prepared over a period of
time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular
time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work
has been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate work.
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work
consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of this title if a fixation of the
work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
68.Id.
69. 17 U.S.C. §204(a) provides:
(a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation

of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a
note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed
by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent.
70. See 17 U.S.C. §202 which provides:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights
under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material
object in which the work is embodied. transfer of ownership of
any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in
which the work is first fixed, does not itself convey any rights
in the copyright work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any material object.
71. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1097-98.
72. See 17 U.S.C. §203.
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U.S.C. §203(a) provides that for works other than those made
for hire, a transfer or license of the copyright or any right under
the copyright is subject to termination thirty-five years after the
transfer or license is made. 7s The Ninth Circuit decision in Dumas and the Supreme Court holding in Community for Creative
Non- Violence, provide for present as well as future copyright
protection for the artist.
VI. IMPACT ON ARTISTS
Preferably, an artist's business transaction includes a written contract which addresses copyright ownership.7. In the absence of a written contractual agreement, an artist who is an independent contractor retains copyright ownership unless the
work is one of the nine categories listed in §lOl(2) and there is a
written agreement. 711
Copyright infringement gives the author the right to recover
the actual damages suft'ered. 76 Generally, the artist is entitled to
the fair market value of the artwork. 77 Furthermore, the author
is entitled to "any profits of the infringer that are attributable to
the infringement and are not taken into account in computing
the actual damages."78 Cost and in some cases, attorneys fees are
also recoverable. 79
Community for Creative Non- Violence establishes that
copyright ownership vests with the independent contractor. Dumas explains that copyright ownership begins with fixation and
the independent contractor initially owns the copyright. If the
artist transfers copyright ownership, the transfer is subject to
termination thirty-five years later.6o By holding that the copyright initially vests with the independent contractor, Commu73. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1098.
74. Any artist working as an independent contractor who contractually agrees to
permit copyright ownership to vest in the client is entitled to unemployment insurance
provided by the client. See CAL. LAB. CODE §3351.5.
75. See supra n. 21 and accompanying text.
76. 17 U.S.C. §504.
77. See Atken v. Hazen, Hoffman, etc., v. Empire Construction Co., 542 F.Supp.
252, 263 (Neb. 1982).
78. 17 U.S.C. §504(b).
79. 17 U.S.C. §505.
80. See 17 U.S.C. §203.
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nity for Creative Non- Violence and Dumas secure for the artist
the "opportunity to renegotiate the transfer after the market
value of the work has been more precisely determined."81
Community for Creative Non- Violence represents a major
step towards advancing artists rights. The artist working as an
independent contractor owns copyright ownership in most cases
and if the copyright is transferred, the independent contractor is
entitled to renegotiate the value of the copyright in the future.

81. Dumas. 865 F.2d at 1098.
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